LAND RENTAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN CHINA by Lohmar, Bryan et al.
May, 2001
Land Rental Market Development and Agricultural Production in China*
Bryan Lohmar, Zhaoxin Zhang and Agapi Somwaru**
Abstract
The development of a land rental market in China may help stimulate further increases in
agricultural production.  This paper provides a description of land rental transactions in rural
China, analyzes the determinants of land supply and demand and estimates the implications land
rental activity has for increasing agricultural production.
*Paper submitted for presentation at the 2001 Annual Meetings of the American Agricultural
Economics Association, Chicago IL, August 5-8.
**Bryan Lohmar and Agapi Somwaru are Economist and Senior Economist at the Economic
Research Service, USDA.  Zhaoxin Zhang is an Economist at the Research Center for Rural
Economy, Ministry of Agriculture, PRC.  Please send comments to blohmar@ers.usda.govLand Rental Market Development and Agricultural Production in China*
Farmers in China face a unique set of land tenure institutions that generate tenure
insecurity and discourage farmers from moving into non-grain crops.  The nominal owners of
farmland in China are collective groups of households or sometimes even the village itself and
the leadership of the collective ownership body allocates the use rights for specific plots to farm
households.
1  In exchange for use rights, farm households pay an agricultural tax and usually, but
not always, are obligated to deliver a grain quota to local grain bureaus at prices predetermined
by the state.  This tenure structure increases tenure insecurity for farm households in rural China
because the collective owners maintain the right to reallocate use rights among farm households
and some villages and collective groups actively take advantage of this right.  The right to rent
one’s use rights to another farm household, however, is increasingly common and legally
sanctioned, and a small land rental market has emerged in rural China.
There is almost no research into the development of rental markets in rural China despite
the fact that a well functioning land rental market could have significant implications for
agricultural production, and many scholars assert that land rental transactions are insufficient to
achieve allocative efficiency (the equalization of the marginal product of land across
households).  Most of the literature concerning farmland in China focuses on land reallocation
policies and the effects these policies have on agricultural production, a legitimate emphasis
because land reallocations have been the most common means of shifting land between
households.  While few studies address land rental transactions specifically, many studies assert,
without evidence, that land rental transactions are too few to represent a well functioning market.
                                                                
1 The central government recommends that the term length of these allocations should be 30 years, but the language
leaves villages with the power to end the allocation contracts if they deem it necessary.2
The reasons thought to be behind sluggish land market development vary from imperfections in
other markets spilling over into the land market to land tenure institutions themselves.
In this paper, we address and analyze some of the important issues concerning land rental
market transactions in rural China.  Using data from a survey of 830 households in 6 provinces
designed specifically to collect information on land market and reallocation policies, we provide
a rich description of the extent to which farm households enter the land rental market and the
terms of the rental contracts.  We estimate aggregate supply and demand for rental land using
reduced form descriptive regression approaches to identify the determinants of renting land and
the effects of rural policies and institutions on land rental transactions.  We also estimate
production functions and test for whether households that rent in farm land have higher marginal
product of land than households that do not rent in land.
Our analysis indicates that land rental transactions are complex, vary significantly
between regions, and that certain rural policies and institutions affect rental transactions in rural
China.  These, in turn, affect aggregate agricultural output by inhibiting the movement of land
from low to high intensity users.  Most of the land rental transactions in the survey are between
members of the same collective group, but not necessarily between relatives and friends.  The
rent paid in these transactions is generally a complex combination of payments from the rentee
household to the rentor household or to a third party (such as paying the agricultural tax on the
land to the village government on behalf of the rentor household).
2  Rural land tenure policies
also affect land rental activity.  In particular, grain quota delivery obligations lower the demand
for rental land or cause village leaders to discourage rental activity, while the expectation of land
reallocation lowers the supply of land at any given rental rate.  A very important and significant
                                                                
2 The household that is allocated use rights and then gives these rights to another household in exchange for some
rental payment is the rentor household.3
determinant of land supply is the extent to which households rely on migrant off-farm labor,
which suggests that land rental transactions are allowing some households to specialize in off-
farm labor while others can gain more land to specialize in agriculture.  Households renting in
land also have a significantly higher marginal product of land than households that do not rent
land, indicating that land rental activity increases the allocative efficiency of land distribution
and aggregate agricultural production and that further gains could be achieved if rental activity
increased.
Land Management Practices in China
To guarantee rural household’s access to land and provide an economic safety-net in rural
areas, land rights are not fully distributed to rural households.  Instead, ownership of farmland
was passed from the communes to village-level collective groups (usually either the village itself
or the xiaozu, a multi-household group within the village that is a remnant of the commune era
production teams) and these groups then allocate use rights to rural households.  The specific
rights originally extended to farmers varied considerably and have undergone changes since the
original distribution in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  There are several types of land tenure
categories in rural China, and some of the variation in rights is due to different tenure categories.
Land that is under the same tenure category, however, is sometimes subject to different rights in
different villages.
Rights to land in rural China come in several different tenure categories.  The most
common land tenure category in rural China is “responsibility land”, land that is allocated to
households and is usually subject to a grain procurement quota.  In addition, households often
have “ration land”, which is normally allocated to households according to their need for grain.4
Ration land is intended to allow households to raise grain for their own subsistence consumption
and is not subject to a quota.  Some villages also have “contract land” for which a fee is paid to
the collective ownership body and is sometimes put up for bid when the contract expires.
Finally, households also often maintain small plots of “private land” on which they usually grow
vegetables for their own consumption or for the market.
The types of tenure categories, and the specific rights associated with each category, vary
from village to village.  Previous research, using a nationally representative data set of 200
villages throughout China, shows that responsibility land comprises about 80 percent of
cultivated land in rural China (Brandt, Huang, Li and Rozelle, 1999).  Data from a 1995 survey
of 31 villages in Northeast China also shows that responsibility land is the most prevalent tenure
type (table 1).  Nearly all villages have responsibility land (97 percent in both 1988 and 1995,
row 1, columns 3 and 4), but each of the other tenure types is present only in a smaller subset of
the villages (columns 3 and 4). There are some exceptions to the general rule of having a
majority of land allocated as responsibility land.  Seven of the 31 villages did not report any
responsibility land and had no corresponding grain quota delivery obligation as well.
The different types of land tenure outlined above usually have different rights associated
with them although the rights associated with each tenure type vary from village to village.  For
example, most villages with responsibility land allow households to rent their plots of
responsibility land to other households (79 percent in 1995 and 73 percent in 1988, table 1
columns 5 and 6) but only about half of the villages that have contract land or ration land allow
households to rent out those plots.  In an environment without ownership rights, renting land is
the only way for households to transfer land among themselves.  Thus, restrictions on renting5
land to other households may lower aggregate agricultural production by preventing land
transfers from low to high intensity users.
The right to rent land in rural China, however, is becoming increasingly common.  The
rise of rental rights can be seen in table 1, a higher percentage of villages report the right to rent
land in 1995 than in 1988 for each of the tenure types (columns 5 and 6).  It is widely held that
rental rights have also expanded significantly since 1995, although there is no data to show this.
While it is believed that farm households have largely received the right to rent land, there is still
widespread skepticism that land rental activity is insufficient to achieve allocative efficiency,
defined as equating the marginal product of land.  The reasons behind this skepticism is that even
though land rental rights have been extended to farm households, a variety of institutions and
policies exist that discourage households from participating in the land rental market either as
suppliers or demanders.
In the following sections, we use a recently collected data set to paint a picture of land
rental market development in China and the implications rental market development has for
agricultural production.  We describe the parties that households are renting their land to and the
features of the rental arrangements.  We analyze the determinants of land rental activity at the
level of the collective group.  Finally, we estimate production functions to test for whether land
rental activity equates the marginal product of land across households or, alternatively, further
rental activity has the potential to increase aggregate agricultural production in China.
1998 Survey
Discrepancies in the Data6
The data used for the remainder of this paper come from a 1998 survey specifically
designed to examine land tenure and rental activity in China.  The survey was a collaborative
effort carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture and Beijing University and covered 825 farm
households from 30 villages in 5 provinces across China.  Enumerators collected data on a wide
range of household and village features including land reallocation activity, land rental activity ,
labor market participation and crop production.  Enumerators not only interviewed farm
households, but also carried out separate interviews with leaders of the collective groups, the
nominal owners of the land.
Initial descriptive statistics, however reveal some important discrepancies in the data.
For example, the percent of households renting land and the amount of land rented varies
significantly who answers the question.  The results from the survey of farm households versus
the survey of collective leaders vary dramatically (tables 2a and 2b).  The most striking
difference between the two survey results is the difference in the estimates of the percent of
rentee households (households that rent land in).  For the respondents to the survey of collective
leaders, only 7 percent of households rent in and roughly the same percent rent land out (table
2a).  The percent of land rented is smaller, with only about 5 percent exchanged according to
collective leaders.
Respondents to the household survey did not provide the same snapshot of rental activity
in rural China (table 2b).  In particular, the percent of households and percent of land rented in is
far greater than that reported in the survey of collective leaders, and also greater than the percent
of land rented out reported by households.  There are a variety of explanations for this
inconsistency and each probably explains part of the discrepancy.  One possible explanation for
these discrepancies is different definitions of “renting” (in this survey, the Chinese term,7
“zhuanbao”, which roughly means “transfer the contract” was used to describe “renting”).  The
most problematic explanation is sampling bias.  In carrying-out the survey, enumerators found
no one at home at some of the households on the list of randomly selected households.  When
this happened, they selected additional households to fill out the survey.  It is hypothesized that
the households with no one home likely had migrated or had full-time non-farm employment and
therefore these households have a high probability of being households that rent land out.  If true,
then the households surveyed (where people were at home) would also have higher probability of
renting in land than if they were randomly selected.  This sample selection bias could explain
some of the discrepancy but can not explain it all.  If the collective leader’s survey number is
correct (7 percent of the households rent in or rent out) and if sample selection bias is behind the
discrepancy between the collective leader’s survey and the household survey, than this implies
that roughly 65 percent of the households were not at home.  While we do not know the number
of households forgone because no one was home at the time of the survey, enumerators agree
that is not nearly as high as 65 percent.
Another potential problem that could result in this discrepancy is that farm households
may have land contracted from the village or collective and consider this to be rented.  Collective
leaders would likely not consider this as zhuanbao land.  Since households that contract land
from the collective are all renting in, not renting out, than the possibility that households are
considering chengbao (contracted) land as zhuanbao (rented) land could explain why the percent
of households renting in land is so much higher than the percent renting out land in the
household portion of the survey.  There is some evidence that suggests this possibility.  For
example, villages in Shanxi province often contract out parcels of fruit orchards to households
and this could explain why more than half of the households in Shanxi province reported that8
they rented in land.  In the 1995 survey in Northeast China (used in table 1), over 80 percent of
the households said they do not know the details of the terms and conditions under which they
are allowed to use the land.  Thus many households may assume that chengbao land is also
zhuanbao land and this would result in a much higher number of households renting in land than
the number renting out land.
It is clear that land rental activity is not uniform among provinces.  For example, the
percent of households and percent of land rented out is roughly twice the survey average in
Zhejiang province, a province that also stands out because it has the highest income levels and
off-farm employment participation of all the provinces in the survey.  Hunan province also has
very high percent of households renting land, but not a significantly higher percent of land
rented.  In some areas, such as Zhejiang and Hebei provinces, the percent of households renting
land out is greater than the percent renting in, but looking at the percent of land rented in and out
in those provinces provides an indication of the underlying reasons for this inconsistency.  In
Hebei province, the percent of land rented in and out are the same, indicating that households
may rent many plots from several households.
Despite these discrepancies, these data hold valuable information and are used for the
analysis that follows and conclusions from the analysis are mindful of the effect of these
discrepancies have on the statistical outcomes.  In the next section, we describe the nature of the
rental contracts.  Using data from the households reporting a rental contract, either renting in or
renting out, we examine who the parties to the contract are, the terms of the contract, the role of
the collective and provide a detailed description of the rents exchanged for the land.
The Nature of Rental Contracts9
Most of the contracts reported in the survey are between households within the collective
and rents generally are not paid in cash but rather through a variety of obligations taken by the
rentor.  In 1998, over two thirds of the households reporting being a party to a rental contract
said that the other party was a household in the same collective group (xiaozu), and almost all
provinces showed this statistic to be more than 50 percent (except in the 5 rental contracts in
Hebei province, table 3, row 2).  The most pronounced example of this is in Zhejiang province,
where 77 percent of the households in the rental market had contracts with other households in
the collective (row 2, column 7).  Renting outside the village, however, was very rare, with only
around 10 percent of the households entering into rental contracts with households outside the
village (row 4).  Renting within the collective likely has lower transactions cost and also
provides additional security in an environment like rural China where written documents are
rarely used.  Eighty-seven percent of the households reported that the rental contracts were only
verbal agreements (row 10).  This additional security may be even more important in rural China
where renting outside the collective may invite dispossession in the next land reallocation.
Land rental contracts between households also tended to be short-term (although the
length of the contract was sometimes ambiguous), and sometimes required collective approval.
Of the households entering into rental contract in the survey, 42 percent said the contract was for
one year only, while 22 percent said it was for more than one year and 36 percent said the term
was undefined (table 3, rows 12, 13, 14).  An exception to these statistics was the province of
Shanxi, where 69 percent of the rental contracts were for one year and the length of tenure was
undefined for only 3 percent (column 3).  Shanxi also reported much higher proportion of rental
contracts approved by the collective, with over 80 percent of the rental contracts approved by the
collective versus only 33 percent of the rental contracts in the whole sample (row 16).  In10
addition, rental contracts in Shanxi were also more rigid, with 75 percent reporting that the
contract cannot be terminated at any time, versus only 39 percent sample-wide (rows 18 and 19).
Many of the responses from Shanxi are thought to be from households contracting fruit orchards
from the collective or village, as indicated in the paper above.
The method of payment also varied substantially among the households in the survey, but
cash payments were rare in many areas.  The majority of households that entered the rental
market in the survey, either as suppliers or demanders, reported that payments to a third party
were part of the rental agreement (table 4).  These payments were generally made to either the
collective or village government and include paying the agricultural tax (62 percent of the
contracts, row 4), delivering the grain quota obligation (56 percent of the households, row 3) and
paying local taxes and collective production costs (52 and 54 percent respectively, rows 5 and 6).
A significantly smaller share of the households actually deliver payments to the rentee
household, such as cash payments (34 percent, row 1) and in-kind payments (19 percent, row 2).
In addition, some rentee households actually paid the rentor household to take over production
on their land (4 percent, row 7), a phenomenon that is sometimes referred to as “negative rents”.
“Negative rents” are thought to result from policies that either fine or expropriate land from
households that do not keep their land in production.  Households wanting to avoid this fine or
avoid losing their land, but lacking the time to farm the land themselves, are willing to pay others
to keep their land in production.  It is also interesting to note that in Shanxi, nearly all of the
rental contracts reported cash payments (94 percent, row 1, column 3) and relatively few
reported payments to a third party, (10-16 percent, rows 3, 4, and 5).  This is in keeping with the11
hypothesis that many farmers in Shanxi reported fruit orchard land contracted for the village as
rented land, since these contracts are usually for cash rather than for quota or other fees.
3
Farm households renting land in rural China also generally make payments either to a
third party or to the rentee household (or group), but usually not both.  If households pay one of
the forms of third party payments, then they are significantly more likely to pay others (table 6).
For example, 62, 56 and 52 percent of the households pay the agricultural tax, the grain quota
and the local tax respectively, but if the household delivers the grain quota obligation, the
probability that they also pay the agricultural tax and local taxes goes up to 99 and 89 percent
respectively (table 5, row 2, columns 1 and 3).  Households that deliver the grain quota,
however, are far less likely to pay cash rent or in-kind rent to the rentee households than the
sample average (16 and 11 percent respectively – row 3, columns 5 and 6, as opposed to 34 and
19 percent respectively for the whole sample, row 1 columns 5 and 6).  Indeed, households that
pay cash rents are significantly less likely to make third party payments (39, 33 and 27 percent
pay agriculture tax, grain quota and local taxes respectively – row 6, columns 1, 2 and 3,
compared to 62, 56 and 52 percent of households sample-wide, row 1).  Households that accept a
subsidy from the rentee household (last row), however, also are significantly more likely to pay
third party payments and, interestingly, deliver an in-kind payment to the rentor household.  The
cash value of the subsidy, therefore, does not represent the true value of the subsidy for many
households because one must first subtract the value of the grain delivered to rentor household.
Determinants of Supply and Demand in China’s Rural Land Rental Market
                                                                
3 The percent paying cost share taxes is slightly higher than other third part payments in Shanxi, but one would
expect this with orchard land that has high water delivery infrastructure maintenance and other collective costs.12
The perception that land is not rented to the point of equating the marginal product of
land across households is common among China scholars and economists studying China
(Prosterman, Hanstad and Ping, 1995; Yao, 2000).  The reasons households do not want to, or
cannot, rent land in or rent land out, however, are still subjects of debate and there has been no
empirical inquiry into this question to date.  A variety of explanations have been discussed in the
literature including rigidities in the labor market (Yao, 2000) and the threat of land expropriation
(Lohmar, 2000).  In this section, we estimate descriptive regressions to reveal whether various
rural policies affect the demand or supply of the land market.
Low levels of rental activity may be due to village land reallocation policies.  It is
commonly believed (although still debated) by scholars inside and outside of China that renting
land to other households exposes the land to dispossession in the next land reallocation carried
out by the collective or village.  If true, then renting land out may be discouraged by this policy.
The extent to which collective and village leaders actually do take land away from households
that rent it out depends on many factors.  In some cases, it may be explicit village policy.  In
other cases, it may be simply due to political considerations:  it is politically less costly to take
land from households that are not using it.  Villages may also have policies whereby if land is
rented with collective approval, or to another member of the collective, then tenure is more
secure than if they rent it without approval or to a household outside the collective.  In addition,
land reallocation activity may also affect the demand for land.  In villages that have actively
reallocated land in the past, the reallocations may have served to transfer land from low intensity
to high intensity users and thus act in lieu of a land market, reducing overall demand for land
(Benjamin and Brandt, 1999).13
Low levels of land rental activity may also be due to grain quota delivery policy and
other related taxes.  For example, because they lower the returns to land, and limit the freedom to
plant cash crops, grain quota delivery obligations may cause farmers to not want to rent land that
they otherwise would want to rent if it had no quota obligation associated with it.  In some
villages, strictly adhering to the policy of sowing the grain delivery quota on the land associated
with it is enforced, while in other villages, farmers can grow cash crops on the land and pay the
quota in cash or with grain purchased on the market.  To do this, some villages may require
permission from collective or village leaders, while others may not.  Village leaders are also
responsible for the collection of grain quota delivery obligations and agricultural taxes and this
may affect their willingness to allow land rental activity in their village.  Due to transaction costs
of collecting a myriad of fees and taxes separately, village leaders often group them together and
collect them once or twice a year, often when a household delivers its quota obligation.  But
when collecting fees, some of which are tied to household’s land allocation, or grain quotas from
households that have rented land out, the collectors are often told that the rentee household is
responsible for the fee, or some portion of it, and the quota delivery.  Because independent land
transfers hamper the collection of local fees, taxes and quotas in this way, leaders in villages with
high tax and quota obligations may actively discourage independent land rental transaction.
To examine whether rural policies and institutions affect land rental activity, we carried
out a series of descriptive regressions.  Because of the differences in the number of households
renting in versus renting out in the household level interviews, we used the collective group
responses for this part of the analysis.  The dependent variable is the percent of households
renting land for the demand side, and the percent of households renting out their land for the
supply side.  Explanatory variables include grain quotas, land reallocation activity, agricultural14
taxes, labor migration and other control variables (including village dummies).  The regressions
are estimated using Generalized Lease Squares to control for village level cluster effects.  These
regressions are still preliminary, there are several econometric issues that need to be addressed
and controlled for, but they offer initial insight into whether and which policies affect land rental
activity in rural China.
The empirical analysis into the effect of village policies and institutions on land rental
activity indicates that land rental activity is affected by unique features of China’s rural economy
(table 6).  On the demand side, the magnitude of the grain quotas are negatively associated with
the percent of land rented in, as is land reallocation activity (as indicated by the number of full
reallocations carried out in the village since the early 1980s).  Reallocation activity is also
negatively correlated with the supply of land, as conjectured above.  In addition to these policy
effects, collective level labor migration is positively correlated with both land supply and
demand, which suggests that land rental market activity arises as labor leaves the village for
work elsewhere.  This finding supports anecdotal evidence from Wanzai County in Jianxi
Province (Murphy, 2000).  Agricultural taxes are positively correlated with both land supply and
demand.  There is no clear explanation for why this might be, but villages with high taxes tend to
be villages with high agricultural output, so the agricultural tax may be picking up the effects of
high productivity villages.
Effects of Land Renting on Agricultural Production
The impediments to land rental market activity identified by the above analysis suggests
that land is under used because it is being farmed by low-intensity users rather than being
transferred to high-intensity users.  Policies and institutions that discourage the transfer of land15
from low to high intensity users contribute to the allocative inefficiency of China’s land
distribution.  Reforming these policies to encourage more land transfers would then,
hypothetically, increase aggregate agricultural production in China.
Differences in the marginal product of land between low and high-intensity users would
suggest that efficiency gains could be achieved by reallocating land.  To test for marginal
product differences between low- and high- intensity users, we estimated agricultural production
functions on the 1422 grain plots reported in the survey (table 7).  Since different types of grain
are grown on different plots, we aggregate the grains by using the value of output as a dependent
variable, a technique that is common in analysis of production in low income rural economies.
The production function models are estimated using GLS to control for village cluster effects.
Models that allow for substitutability of land and labor are also presented.  In addition to the
traditional factors of production, the models include a dummy variable for whether the household
rents in land.  A positive coefficient on the rent in dully would suggest that these users are more
productive.  We also estimate models that interact this variable with land and labor inputs to
investigate whether there are differences in the marginal product of land and labor for
households that rent in land.
Results from these estimated production functions provide strong evidence that
households renting in land achieve higher land productivity than households that do not rent in
land, indicating that land rental transactions can increase aggregate agricultural production in
China (table 7).  The coefficient on the land rental dummy and land size interaction term
variable, are positive and significant in each of the four specifications.  Taking the last of the
specifications as an estimate, we find that households renting in land have a marginal product of16
land that is 47.6 yuan/mu higher than households that do not rent land, representing a 16.5
percent higher marginal product of land for households that rent land.
Conclusions
This paper is among the first to address some important questions concerning land rental
market development in China.  In this paper, we make use of a 1998 household-level survey to
describe the extent of land rental contracting in China, the types of contracts used, the
institutional effects on land rental market activity and the implications land renting has for
agricultural production in China.  We find that land rental activity is widespread but not across
all regions in China.  Part of the variation in land rental activity may be due to other tenure
policies that tend to encourage or discourage land rental activity, such as grain quota obligations
and village land reallocation activity.
Perhaps our most important conclusion is that land rental activity increases aggregate
agricultural production by transferring land from low intensity farm households to households
willing to farm the land more intensively.   The marginal product of land for households renting
land in is 50-90 yuan/mu higher than for households that do not rent land.  Policies that
discourage land rental activity, such as grain quotas and arbitrary reallocation policies, indirectly
hold back agricultural production increases through their effects on land rental activity.
Interestingly, agricultural taxes encourage households to rent out their land, presumably to seek
higher payoff economic activities, thus agricultural taxes serve to increase agricultural
production by encouraging land transfer from low to high intensity users.17
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Right to Rent for
the Given Tenure
Type*
1995 1988 1995 1988 1995 1988
(percent of land) (percent of villages) (percent of villages)
Responsibility Land 76 86 97 97 79 73
Ration Land 10 3 32 13 56 40
Private Land 4 5 45 52 92 87
Contract Land 9 4 77 52 48 44
Other** 1 1 13 13
* Only for the villages reporting the particular tenure category
** Usually reclaimed wasteland and this is often given to the households that participate in the
reclamation effort.
Source:  1995 Survey of 780 households in Hebei and Liaoning Provinces by World Bank,
RCRE and CCAP.19
Table 2a.  Collective-Level Land Rental Market Activity in 6 Provinces in 1998
Survey
Average
Hebei Shanxi Anhui Hunan SichuanZhej’ng
(percent of households)
Renting In 7 1 5 5 12 6 7
Renting Out 7 4 2 5 12 5 13
(percent of land)
Rented In 5 2 7 3 7 3 5
Rented Out 5 2 1 3 9 3 11
Table 2b.  Household Survey Averages of Rental Activity for 6 Provinces in 1988
Survey
Average
Hebei Shanxi Anhui Hunan SichuanZhej’ng
(percent of households)
Renting In 24 2 51 12 26 25 33
Renting Out 5 1 2 2 6 4 16
(percent of land)
Rented In 13 2 26 42 15 11 28
Rented Out 2 1 1 0 3 4 420
Table 3.  Description of Rental Contracts for 1998 MOA Data
Survey
Average
Hebei Shanxi Anhui Hunan SichuanZhej’ng
(number)




Collective Member 67 20 64 75 53 76 77
Village Resident 20 80 10 10 43 10 17
Outside of Village 10 0 17 10 4 13 6
Immediate Family 16 20 3 5 11 29 29
Close Relative 13 20 4 15 9 22 20
Distant Relative 6 20 4 15 6 7 3
Friend 11 20 3 5 28 17 8
Other 49 20 79 55 47 17 40
Type of Agreement
Oral 87 100 85 70 96 85 86
Written 13 0 15 30 4 12 14
Length of Contract
1 year 42 40 69 5 28 20 51
More than One Year 22 20 28 35 9 12 25
Undefined 36 40 3 60 62 68 22
No answer 1 0 0 0 2 0 3
Contract Approved
by Collective
Yes 33 0 81 30 0 15 26




Yes 60 80 25 70 83 73 65
No 39 20 75 25 17 22 35
1 0 0 5 0 5 021





Hebei Shanxi Anhui Hunan SichuanZhej’ng
(percent of contracts)
Payments To Rentee
Cash 34 60 94 0 4 22 12
In-Kind (Grain) 19 0 4 10 60 17 11
Payments to Third
Party
Quota Delivery 56 60 13 80 53 73 72
Agricultural Tax 62 60 10 80 60 76 80
Local Tax 52 60 16 80 38 71 77




4 0 0 5 0 2 11
*Arrangements are not mutually exclusive22















(percent of contracts reporting given type of rent payment)
Sample Average 62 56 52 54 34 19 4
Of the Contracts
Reporting Ag. Tax





99 89 86 16 12 6
Of the Contracts
Reporting Local Fee
Payment (n=100) 100 94 97 13 13 6
Of the Contracts
Reporting Cost Share
Payment (n=60) 98 95 95 12 13 3
Of the Contracts
Reporting Cash Rent
Payment (n=84) 39 33 27 32 5 0
Of the Contracts
Reporting In-Kind
Rent Payment (n=29) 48 48 18 52 14 14
Of the Contracts
Reporting Subsidy
Payment (n=9) 78 78 78 78 0 4423
Table 6.  Determinants of Aggregate Demand and Supply in Rural China’s Land Rental
Market, 1998
Dependent Variable: Demand:
Percent of Land Rented In
Supply:
Percent of Land Rented Out
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Land Features
























































































R-square 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.27
All regressions are GLS regressions controlling for village level cluster effects.  Standard errors are in parenthesis
Asterisks *, **, *** represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.24
Table 7.  Production Effects of Land Rental Activity



























































































Village dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared .67 .67 .67 .68 .68
T-statistics are in parenthesis, asterisks *, **, *** represent significance of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively